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The Probable Necessity of an
International Prison in Solving
Aircraft Hijacking
I. The New Hague Convention on Aircraft Hijacking
In a prose passage that translates easily into found verse, the Polish
historian Jasienica has also stated the conditions under which the legal
draftsman must work in trying to encompass the unknown future:
Attempt a definition of the motive
that attracts this group of writers to history
That attraction is the graceless beauty
which is alien to all ideas of symmetry
Its love of ambuscades and surprises
which equate to cruelty and inexpressible waste
The tragic muse
which constantly accompanies its development
All are elements which




On December 16, 1970, at the Hague, a Convention to Suppress Unlaw-
ful Seizure of Aircraft was concluded and signed by a Diplomatic Confer-
ence convened under the auspices of the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO). Seventy-seven states were represented at the Con-
ference. Among them was the Soviet Union, which recently joined the
ICAO as its 120th member. The Conference adopted the Convention by
seventy-four votes to none. Fifty States among those represented signed
the Convention. The Convention was next to be opened for additional
signatures by all States, in London, Moscow and Washington, on January
*LL.B., Harvard (1948); B.A., University of Chicago (1942); Member, Beverly Hills
and Illinois State Bar Associations, State Bar of California.
International Lawyer, Vol. 5, No. 2
270 INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
1, 1971, and will become effective after ratification by at least ten addition-
al states.
The Convention was based upon a draft prepared by the ICAO. 1 The
ICAO news release states that the new Convention "provides for effective
legal measures being taken to deter acts of unlawful seizure of aircraft
(hijacking) through the co-operation of nations throughout the world."
Beyond a doubt, the new Hague Convention is a major step. Effective
laws are often a progression, and this is progression.
But there is a problem. It is one of major consequence. The best way to
illustrate the problem is by stating that a key party did not sign the new
Convention, and that party, if it is some consolation to the women's
liberation groups, is a woman-Leila Khaled.
Nor is she facetiously identified as a key, necessary signator. The fact is
that an attractive, fervent, intelligent woman is loose in the world who has
on two occasions been perfectly willing to risk her own life by taking on
board airliners, carrying hundreds of helpless passengers, explosives ca-
pable of destroying those airliners and those passengers.
The new Hague Convention is based on a concept finalized at least as
long ago as December, 1969. The nightmare hijackings of 1970 have
pointed out two major weaknesses in its basic concepts: (1) The vulnerabil-
ity of the aircraft of any host nation endeavoring to prosecute any hijacker,
and (2) the political difficulties involved in extraditing a hijacker to a
country certain to prosecute such hijacker severely.
Vulnerability ofAircraft of Host Country
This difficulty is illustrated by quotations from an article which appeared
in The New York Times on September 27, 1970, British Deny Any Deal,
by Anthony Lewis:
London Sept. 26 ... British officials had no independent confirmation tonight
that the Palestinian guerillas would release the remaining hostages .... If all
the hostages get out of Jordan safely and return home, Britain and the other
countries concerned - Switzerland, West Germany, and Israel-will face a
difficult moral and political question. That is whether to free the imprisoned
terrorists. Britain, for example, offered to release Miss Leila Kahled as part of
any arrangement for the freeing of all the hostages. Miss Kahled was captured
in an attempt to hijack an El Al plane three weeks ago. The guess here is that
the British Government would feel moral obligation to free Miss Kahled even
though no deal was finally made. There is also the practical point that failure
to release her might lead to other hijacking or terrorist attacks by the Arabs
on British planes." [Emphasis added]
1World Peace Through Law Center, Pamphlet Series Number 13 (December, 1969),
contains the Convention then proposed by ICAO. It is substantially similar in key paragraphs
to the newly-adopted Convention (with the interesting exception of Article 12 of the new
convention, discussed elsewhere in this article.)
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And in fact a British airliner was hijacked just to reinforce the demands
for the release of Miss Khaled. Moreover, the governments of Greece,
Switzerland, and West Germany have been so blackjacked to release
hijackers. Countries prosecuting hijackers have had their passenger air-
liners bombed, and other bombing attempts have been prevented only
narrowly.
Political Difficulties
This can best be illustrated by recent current events:
Assume that a Lithuanian hijacks a Soviet Airliner to Alaska? Will this
country extradite?
Assume that a person of Jewish origin hijacks a Soviet Airliner to
Israel? Will Israel extradite?
Would Cuba extradite Angela Davis back to the United States? Would
Chile?
In 1970, the Japan Research Institute of Air Law published a "Draft
Convention for Securing the Safety of Hijacked Passengers and Other
Persons" drafted by M. Miyagi and Y. Murakami. The Convention, Miyagi
and Murakami relate, was prompted by the "Yodo-go Incident" of March,
1970 (several Japanese student members of the Zengakuren seized a plane
and forced it to North Korea). That Convention was drafted with the
direction of being acceptable to Communist bloc countries, and the safety
of passengers was its primary consideration.2
It is their summary of the problems of extradition which is in point here:
However, a) in pondering over what punishment should be appropriate to
certain acts, inter alia, political offences, we shall reach a greatly different
conclusion according to our respective values, ideologies, political and legal
systems. b) It will not always be easy to reconcile the differences between
nations in "Schuldurteii" or the judgment of the penal responsibilty.
So far, the principle of non-extradition of political criminals and the prin-
ciple of non-extradition of compatriots are generally accepted under in-
ternational law. Some States recognize these principles by expressly stating
them in their municipal law. Thus, considerable difficulty is anticipated on the
subject of extradition of hijackers.
In many of the hijacking incidents there has been reflected the international
political situation: one of the parties concerned is of the Communist bloc or
on another side of a divided state.
2
"Acting on the basic position that the deterring of hijacking or apprehension of hijackers
should not be effected at the risk of passengers, we should leave pre- or post-hijacking
problems (e.g. preventive measures or punishment and extradition of offenders, jurisdiction,
etc.) to the aforesaid conventions of ICAO, while as to the safety of passengers and others,
we should draft another convention which is independent and separate from the above. All
these conventions are each to be grasped from different aspects as performing different
functions respectively and they would combine to form complete measures against hijacking."
international Lawyer, Vol. 5, No. 2
272 INTERNA TIONAL LA WYER
On the other hand, conventions drafted by ICAO are usually opened to
member states of the United Nations or its specialized agencies (e.g. Tokyo
Convention, Article 19). It will be difficult for Communist China, North
Vietnam, North Korea and certain East European countries, which are very
likely to become one of the parties to a hijacking incident, to accede to an
ICAO convention. It will therefore be difficult to expect the full effectiveness
of an ICAO convention in this respect.
The relevant paragraphs of the new Hague Convention are as follows:
Article 6
1. Upon being satisfied that the circumstances so warrant, any Contracting
State in the territory of which the offender or the alleged offender is present,
shall take him into custody or take other measures to ensure his presence.
The custody and other measures shall be provided in the law of that State but
may only be continued for such time as is necessary to enable any criminal or
extradition proceedings to be instituted.
2. Such State shall immediately make a preliminary inquiry into the facts.
3. Any person in custody pursuant to paragraph I of this Article shall be
assisted in communicating immediately with the nearest appropriate represen-
tative of the State of which he is a national.
4. When a State, pursuant to this Article, has taken a person into custody,
it shall immediately notify the State of registration of the aircraft, the State
mentioned in Article 4, paragraph 9(c), the State of nationality of the detained
person and, if it considers it advisable, any other interested States of the fact
that such person is in custody and of the circumstances which warrant his
detention. The State which makes the preliminary enquiry contemplated in
paragraph 2 of this Article shall promptly report its findings to the said States
and shall indicate whether it intends to exercise jurisdiction.
Article 7
The Contracting State in the territory of which the alleged offender is found
shall, if it does not extradite him, be obliged, without exception whatsoever
and whether or not the offence was committed in its territory, to submit the
case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution.
Those authorities shall take their decision in the same manner as in the
case of any ordinary offence of a serious nature under the law of that State.
Article 8
1. The offense shall be deemed to be included as an extraditable offence in
any extradition treaty existing between Contracting States. Contracting
States undertake to include the offence as an extraditable offence in every
extradition treaty to be concluded between them.
2. If a Contracting State which makes extradition conditional on the exis-
tence of a treaty receives a request for extradition from another Contracting
State with which it has no extradition treaty, it may as its option consider this
Convention as the legal basis for extradition in respect of the offence. Extra-
dition shall be subject to the other conditions provided by the law of the
requested State.
3. Contracting States which do not make extradition conditional on the
existence of a treaty shall recognize the offence as an extraditable offence
between themselves subject to the conditions provided by the law of the
requested State.
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4. The offence shall be treated, for the purpose of extradition between
Contracting States, as if it had been committed not only in the place in which
it occurred but also in the territories of the States required to establish their
jurisdiction in accordance with Article 4, paragraph 1.
Article 12
1. Any dispute between two or more Contracting States concerning the
interpretation or application of this Convention which cannot be settled
through negotiation, shall, at the request of one of them, be submitted to
arbitration. If within six months from the date of the request for arbitration
the Parties are unable to agree on the organization of the arbitration, any one
of those Parties may refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice by
request in conformity with the Statute of the Court.
2. Each State may at the time of signature or ratification of this Convention
or accession thereto, declare that it does not consider itself bound by the
preceding paragraph. The other Contracting States shall not be bound by the
preceding paragraph with respect to any Contracting State having made such
a reservation.
3. Any Contracting State having made a reservation in accordance with the
preceding paragraph may at any time withdraw this reservation by notifica-
tion to the Depositary Governments.
It is observable then that the new Convention is designed to work
on the principles of either extradition by the State which obtains jurisdic-
tion of the hijacker to the injured State or, in the alternative, retention of
custody by the State which obtains jursidiction and punishment by such
State.
It is submitted that it is not probable that this mechanism will prove
effective over a lengthy period of time. The joinder of the Soviet Union to
the ICAO will not solve the problem of the Communist bloc countries
because of the apparent divisions within that bloc and lack of total Soviet
control. In fact, in an Associated Press dispatch quotation, Tass, on De-
cember 29, 1970, in justifying the sentences imposed on the eleven persons
convicted in the Leningrad hijacking case, cited the new Convention (Ar-
ticle 2) wherein "each Contracting State undertakes to make the offense
punishable by severe penalties." In other words, the dicta of Jasienica
proved out rather quickly.
II. The Probable Necessity of an International Prison
In Solving Aircraft Hijacking
In November 1970, the author submitted to the World Peace Through
Law Center, a suggested approach to the problem of aircraft hijacking. The
essence of the draft proposal for a model treaty was that each contracting
jurisdiction to such treaty or convention would, within a period of 24 hours
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after obtaining custody of any alleged hijacker, transport such person to the
now unused Spandau Prison, where he would be detained until guilt or
innocence was determined by an appropriate tribunal and where, there-
after, any sentence would be served. It was suggested that the In-
ternational Court of Justice would be such an appropriate tribunal, which is
the reason Article 12 of the new Convention is so interesting-even if
unworkable because of the delay of six months from request for arbitration
before the dispute might even be referred to the International Court of
Justice.
The Spandau Prison was only suggestive. A prison in Lichtenstein-or
any place which does not have its own passenger planes-would do just as
well. But the Spandau Prison is a model type of what would seem to be a
workable situation, at least for the time being. There is in fact existing
major-power supervision over this particular prison. West Berlin does not
have its own airlines. It is a prison which falls within the area of both
non-Communist and Communist control.
Insofar as the use of the International Court of Justice is concerned,
Secretary General U Thant has suggested trials for hijacking conducted by
a U.N. tribunal. But why create one more tribunal when we have an ex-
isting one? It is something similar to the problem inherent in the efforts to
create an International Court of Criminal Justice. We do have an In-
ternational Court of Justice. To say the least, it does not have very much to
do. In the author's proposal, 3 the jurisdiction of the Tribunal would be
limited to the imposition of a penalty the maximum of which would be that
of the extraditing State, and it was provided that the extraditing State
would appoint a judge if it so desired, to determine what the maximum
punishment is under the laws of the extraditing State, and requiring the
Court to follow this judgment as to the law of the extraditing State. This
would avoid the very grave problem which could result when the extra-
diting State under its law does not provide for the death penalty, and be
afraid that if it extradited the alleged hijacker, the death penalty would be
imposed by the State to which the hijacker was extradited. In fact, the two
major signators, the United States and the Soviet Union, both provide for
the death penalty in cases of aircraft hijacking, a stigmata which might well
negate there ever being any real possibility of the new Convention being
effective since the path of flight of the hijackers is recurrently from the
larger States to the smaller States.
Under the proposal, then, if Miss Khaled had been extradited within 24
hours to the Spandau Prison by Great Britian, Great Britain would have
been relieved of the threat of blackmail. Those freed from prisons in
3See page 274 et seq., infra.
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Switzerland, Greece and West Germany who had in fact killed, would still
have been in prison at Spandau-or at the very least their release would
have been the subject of close coordination. It is conceivable that Cuba
might consent to extradition to Spandau when it never would consent
otherwise. And most of all, and best of all, those supporting the quest for
world peace through world law might at last have something indeed resem-
bling a working World Court.
Model Extradition Treaty
The contracting parties to this Treaty, declaring that the crime of aircraft
hijacking must be proscribed, for reasons obvious to all civilized human
beings, agree as follows:
1. Each contracting party shall arrest and intercept, by whatever reason-
able means necessary, consonant with the aim of perserving human life:
(a) Any person who commits or attempts to commit the hijacking of any
aircraft flying over their territory or
(b) Any person who commits or attempts to commit the hijacking of any
aircraft within air space or territory subject to legal entry by such contracting
party, or
(c) Any person who commits or attempts to commit the hijacking of any
aircraft and who lands in territory subject to legal entry by the contracting
party, either during the course of the actual attempt to hijack such aircraft or
thereafter and at any time within one year after the commission of such act of
hijacking or attempt to commit such hijacking.
2. The crime of aircraft hijacking is defined as the commission of
any affirmative act (including any oral or written utterance) by any person
designed to divert such aircraft from its scheduled flight and to prevent it,
from continuing on its scheduled flight without interruption or fear on the
part of any passenger or member of the crew, and by any means in fact
resulting in the creation of a reasonable belief on the part of any of the
crew or passengers of any such aircraft that if such aircraft is not diverted
from its normal scheduled flight, then as a proximate and probable con-
sequence some physical harm or damage will be caused to one or more
persons either aboard said aircraft or elsewhere, or damage of some nature
will be caused to the aircraft or some other substantial object, and unless
said aircraft is diverted from its scheduled flight.
3. Each contracting party shall forthwith, and within a period of
twenty-four (24) hours if at all possible, upon obtaining custody of any
person who appears to be involved in a hijacking, and who is not a citizen
of the contracting party, cause such person to be transported to the
Spandau Prison, West Berlin, for appropriate custodial supervision, pro-
vided the following shall have been previously accomplished:
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(a) A Tribunal shall have been established or authorized by the United
Nations to adjudicate the guilt, and also punishment, of any such person so
allegedly involved in the crime of hijacking.
(b) The rules and regulations of said Tribunal shall provide that the punish-
ment of any person delivered to custody shall not exceed the maximum
punishment provided by the law of the extraditing state.
(c) The rules and regulations of said Tribunal shall provide that custodial
supervison of the person in custody shall be maintained at all times by guards
provided by the members of the Security Council in agreed ratio.
(d) The rules and regulations of said Tribunal shall provide that no prisoner
shall be released from Spandau Prison except upon a finding of "not guilty"
by the Tribunal, or, if such person is convicted and sentenced to a term in
prison, except upon the completion of any term prescribed by the Tribunal, or
upon the concurrence of all members of the Security Council.
4. In the event of any doubt as to the citizenship of the person allegedly
involved in the hijacking, such person shall forthwith be delivered to
Spandau Prison until such question is resolved. Such question shall be
resolved by the stated Tribunal.
5. In the event the person involved appears ill or sick or wounded, and is
unable to be transported for physical or mental reasons, and it is deter-
mined that such person's nationality may be alien to that of the contracting
party, then custody of such person shall be placed under the supervision of
guards employed or authorized by the Tribunal, and such person is to be
kept within the jurisdiction of the contracting party, but under the custodial
supervision of said guards, and until such person is able to be transported
to Spandau Prison, or until the citizenship of such person is determined. At
such time as any physician duly appointed by the Tribunal shall determine
that such person is able to be transported, then, in the sole determination of
such physician, and at all times under the supervision of guards employed
or authorized by the Tribunal, such person shall then be transported to the
Spandau Prison, and for appropriate proceedings, if it is also determined he
is not a citizen of the contracting party.
6. The contracting party from whose jurisdiction any such person is
transported to Spandau Prison shall have the right to appoint to the par-
ticular Tribunal that acts to adjudicate guilt or innocence, and punishment
of any person found guilty, a judge of the said contracting party, who shall
then have the right to a single vote in any decision affecting the said alleged
person, except said judge shall have the right of final determination of what
is the maximum sentence that could be imposed on any person found guilty
under the laws of the land of the contracting party from whose jurisdiction
any such person has been removed, such determination to be binding on
the Tribunal.
7. Each contracting party shall return the full control of the hijacked
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aircraft to the custody of the legally designated commander, and permit the
said aircraft and passengers and cargo to continue the flight with as little
delay as possible.
8. No passengers are to be detained by the state in whose territory a
hijacked plane lands for any reason, and the state in whose territory a
hijacked plane lands shall not in any manner restrict the continued flight
and passage of the hijacked aircraft and passengers.
9. The state in whose territory a hijacked aircraft lands assumes full
responsibility for the safety of the passengers, the crew and the aircraft,
and agrees that the Tribunal shall determine any liability and money dam-
ages to be paid by such state, and for any dereliction from this duty.
10. After the entry into force of this Treaty, any contracting party who
fails to abide by the terms agreed to herein, and any non-contracting party
who fails to abide by the terms agreed to herein by all contracting parties,
shall be subject to the penalty, if the Tribunal, by a majority vote, so
decrees, of not being permitted to participate in world air traffic as con-
ducted by the contracting parties, and to the extent and in the manner
adjudicated by the Tribunal, and for the period adjudicated by the Tribun-
al. After the entry into force of this Treaty, the failure of any contracting
party, or non-contracting party, to extradite any alleged hijacker and within
a twenty-four hour period, unless good cause if forthwith stated, shall be
deemed to constitute good cause for any contracting party hereto refusing
to permit its aircraft to fly into or within air space controlled by the
non-performing party, and shall be good cause for any contracting party
hereto to refuse to permit any aircraft of the non-performing party to land
within the jurisdiction of the other contracting party or parties, and shall be
good cause for any contracting party hereto refusing to permit any citizen
of such non-perforning party from landing within its boundaries and until
there is forthwith compliance with the requirement of delivery of any
accused hijacker to the aforesaid Spandau Prison.
11. Cost of the operation of the Spandau Prison and Tribunal for the
purposes hereof shall be assessed among the contracting parties by the
Tribunal.
12. Any contracting party hereto may withdraw from the requirements
hereof on thirty (30) days written notice to the Tribunal. Such withdrawal
shall not affect the obligations of such contracting party to deliver to
Spandau Prison any hijacker causing any hijacking to be committed prior
to the expiration of said thirty (30) days.
13. (a) Any party to this Treaty may propose amendments to this
Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the
Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all parties to the
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Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the
parties to the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a confer-
ence, to which they shall invite all the parties to the Treaty, to consider
such an amendment.
(b) Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the
votes of all the parties to the Treaty. The amendment shall enter into force
for each party that deposits its instrument of ratification of the amendment
upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by a majority of all the parties.
Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any other party upon the deposit of its
instrument of ratification of the amendment.
14. (a) This Treaty shall be open to all states for signature. Any state
which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance
with paragraph (c) of this article may accede to it at any time.
(b) This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory states. In-
struments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with
the Governments of ---------- -- , which are hereby
designated the Depositary Governments.
(c) This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by ten or more
states but not before six months from the date of its initial ratification by the
first ratifying state.
(d) For states whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited
subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on
the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.
(e) The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and
acceding states of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each
instrument of ratification or of accession, the date of the entry into force of
this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests for convening a confer-
ence or other notices.
(f) This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pur-
suant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.
15. This Treaty shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary
Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by
the Depositary Governments to the governments of the signatory and
acceding states.
In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this
Treaty.
Done in - at - this - of
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